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Belanger 1 
Currently, grassroots community organizers aim to promote the particular claims 
of marginalized and oppressed individuals, groups or points of views that do not receive 
just representation in the political system. This thesis contends that organizers ought to 
develop a comprehensive practice of democracy in their local communities rather than 
focus entirely on advancing particularized interests. 
By entering into a relationship with the powerless, community organizers find 
themselves implicated in the representation of these entities, as the institutional 
representative structure often fails those lacking political power and voice. As such, this 
theoretical study of community organizers within broader democratic theory must turn 
first to applicable theories of representation. This thesis will examine three theories in 
particular: the individualistic approach that dominates mainstream liberal thought; the 
group-based approach as defended by Iris Young and others on the Left; and the 
discourse-based approach as advanced by John Dryzek, drawing on a critical or post 
modern analysis. This thesis will argue that all three of these theories should be seen as 
“discourses,” insofar as they are all grounded in assumptions that are not themselves 
defensible by reference to objective facts or neutral philosophical principles. 
Particular community organizing nonprofits ground themselves in one of these 
three theories of representation. Individual-based representation appears in ACORN; 
group-based in both DART and IAF; and U.S. PIRG exemplifies nonprofits attempting to 
represent a particular discourse. Despite the differences in these organizations, they all 
maintain the traditional aim of particularized representation of specific individuals, 
groups and discourses over this project’s ideal of comprehensive discursive 
representation. As this thesis contends, instead of restricting themselves to representing 
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these narrow interests, grassroots organizers should embrace a “comprehensive 




Integral to this thesis is the concept of discourse. Before addressing questions of 
representation through which this project aims to understand the organizing process, one 
must first understand what constitutes a discourse. Iris Marion Young, a theorist of group 
representation, herself offers a definition of what she calls a discourse, describing it as  
a system of stories and expert knowledge diffused through the society, 
which convey the widely accepted generalizations about how the society 
operates that are theorized in these terms, as well as the social norms and 
cultural values to which most of the people appeal when discussing their 
social and political problems and proposed solutions (Young, 2001, p. 
685).  
 
This understanding matches neatly with the Dryzek’s definition. Dryzek conceptualizes a 
discourse as a “set of categories and concepts embodying specific assumptions, 
judgments, contentions, dispositions, and capabilities” (Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2008, p. 
481). Neither individuals nor groups—the two main entities considered in more 
traditional representation theory—have the capacity to escape from the implications of 
discourses, as they form the lens through which the world is perceived.  
Discourses, while certainly less concrete in composition and more theoretically 
slanted than either individuals or groups, maintain certain qualities and characteristics. 
They must recognize and deny certain motives, provide an “account of the relationships 
taken to prevail between agents and others,” and employ common metaphors and other 
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rhetorical devices (Dryzek 482). Again, discourses pervade all facets of life and, as such, 
implicate a variety of aspects in their presentation. 
In these definitions, what stands out most is the depth at which the discourses 
affect the lives of those who hold them. Discourses, Dryzek and Niemeyer (2008) claim, 
“are not just a surface manifestation of interests because discourses help constitute 
identities and their associated interests” (p. 482). Therefore, more than affect the lives of 
the individuals who hold them, discourses actually constitute and develop those very 
identities. 
Significantly, especially in the context of the particular discussion at hand, 
discourses and individuals do not associate in a one-to-one relationship. Discourses are 
shared among many individuals, and individuals are shared among many discourses at 
the same time. In a key distinction from groups, discourses allow multiple facets of the 
individual to be expressed (Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2008, p. 483). Instead of foreclosing on 
the multifaceted identities for which this study seeks to develop a fuller representation at 
the grassroots level, discourses facilitate an exploration of those different components. As 
this thesis contends, this understanding of discourse, in light of representation theory and 

























 Grassroots organizers typically set as their goal the empowerment and 
engagement of the interests with which they work. However, organizers must also self-
consciously address their role as representatives. When entire sections of the 
population—urban, rural, minority, disabled, etc.—are ignored by public officials, 
organizers are often the only semi-political agents active in the community who can act 
on their behalf. Therefore, it proves essential to the organizing process to address the 
issues raised by political representation and, in doing so, to establish a new 
conceptualization of representation by which the community might achieve a more just 
representative structure. 
Theorists have advocated the representation of individuals, groups and non-group-
based discourses. This chapter will examine each of these and show that all of these 
approaches ground themselves in constitutive discourses. True political representation, as 
this chapter will argue, hinges neither on the individual nor even on the group but instead 
on the comprehensive representation of all relevant discourses.  
 
Individual Representation 
 The dominant approach to representation today focuses on the representation of 
individual citizens. As advanced most powerfully by philosophers of the Enlightenment 
and applied practically in American and French revolutionary governments, the solitary 
rational individual stands alone as the entity best able to express interests and demand 
just representation. Displayed regularly through the all-important vote, the participatory 
act of individual representation, it is argued, overcomes disparities in birth or wealth to 
equalize all in the eyes of representative government. While a revolutionary, status quo-
Belanger 6 
challenging force in the seventeenth century, this conceptualization of society as 
composed of freestanding individuals now itself furthers injustice and fails to meet the 
high standard its original thinkers established for it. 
 
Pitkin’s Individual-based Discourse 
No discussion of representation can take place without first considering the work 
of Hanna Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, in which she identifies the four main 
forms of representation: formalistic, symbolic, descriptive and substantive. Despite her 
claims of impartiality, Pitkin, a twentieth century philosopher of democratic 
representation theory, operated from an essentially individual-based discourse. According 
to Pitkin, substantive representation alone concerns the actual activity of doing 
substantively beneficial things for the electorate, while the other three refer to states of 
being. In descriptive representation, “what matters is not their actions…but what they are, 
or are like” (Pitkin, 1967, p. 81). For example, a Hispanic person can represent a 
Hispanic neighborhood solely based on their shared physical or historical characteristics. 
Symbolic representation, on the other hand, insists that a representative hold some 
meaning for her constituency. Under symbolic representation, a community might elect a 
war veteran strictly due to his or her affiliation with the flag or other patriotic symbols. 
The formalistic understanding deals, at its root, with the authorization and accountability 
of representatives. Formalism acknowledges that representatives must first receive 
legitimacy, then retroactive support, from those on whose behalf they claim to speak. It 
does not, however, ground this legitimacy in substantive contributions that 
representations make to the lives of the represented citizens. 
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Pitkin ultimately resolves that the active role of substantive representation places 
it in a more defensible position than the alternatives. Despite her attempts to segregate 
along lines of action and inaction, Pitkin ultimately bases herself in a discourse of 
individual representation. Her adoption of an individual-based discourse prevents her 
from addressing disparities in power from other perspectives. “I am not suggesting an 
organic group mind. What the public does or thinks must (in theory) be translatable into 
the behavior or attitudes of individuals” (Pitkin, 1967, p. 224). She discredits the 
discourses that would point to these disparities, dismissing them as descriptive and 
symbolic in nature. She suggests instead that substantive benefit ought to be pursued 
through regular elections that demonstrate voter preferences.  
 
The Individualistic City 
 To clarify individual representation and the alternative forms discussed later in 
the chapter, one can take a typical American metropolitan area as an example. The central 
city has significant racial, economic and gender diversity, as is typical in many cities in 
the United States, and political institutions typical of such metropolitan areas are 
composed of popularly elected officials. In the case of individual representation, the city 
bustles with enlightened, knowledgeable individual citizens, each of whom maintains a 
strict list of personal preferences that enables rational determination of his or her political 
decisions. Exemplified most clearly in the Supreme Court’s Baker v. Carr decision—
“one-person, one-vote”—, individual representation expresses itself in this model city 
through the voting booth. Elected representatives serve at the whim of other individual 
voters, and the political unit does not extend beyond that individual-to-individual 
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relationship. Civic associations—unions, parent-teacher associations, etc.—conceive of 
themselves as assemblies of individuals with no real political opinion beyond the 
aggregated mean of their memberships. Life in this city centers on individuals interacting 
with individuals; from this perspective, representation too follows individual interest. 
 
The Shortcomings of the Individual 
The individual model assumes individuality, rationality and systematic fairness 
and impartiality; in fact, however, the discourse from which our current understanding of 
representation operates does hold an unarguable number of biases. Culturally, 
individualistic representation favors bourgeois Eurocentric understandings of the person 
as a solitary individual, thus dismissing certain more group-based leanings inherent in 
less bourgeois non-European cultures. Socially, the class that developed the concept of 
“the individual” into what it is in modern political society was composed exclusively of 
wealthy white men, and discursive contributions from peasants, workers and others 
received little attention. In terms of gender biases, individualistic representation values 
the male traits of autonomy and independence while devaluing the traditionally feminine 
qualities of cooperation and group-building. Philosophically speaking, Locke’s 
understanding of men as rational, solitary individuals justifies his system of individual 
representation, as is the case with many Enlightenment-era philosophers; therefore, strict 
adherence to individual representation does not produce an unbiased result but instead 
draws implicitly upon the historical and philosophical contexts—the discourses—that 
surround it. Ultimately, the allegedly impartial individualistic form of representation 
reflects its own discourse that holds certain assumptions that favor some parts of society 
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over others and delegitimizes discourses that seek to call attention to group-based 
inequities or to relevant discourses that are not subjectively held by voting citizens. 
This conceptualization of representation pervades contemporary American 
society. Representation is addressed in the Constitution through an individualistic 
discourse. In the electoral processes from which the government claims its legitimacy, the 
biases mentioned above make themselves evident and challenge the impartiality and 
fairness of the institutions as a whole. Certain individuals—members of Congress, for 
example—represent other individuals, and each behaves as a solitary unit. This 
understanding traces its roots most clearly to the Enlightenment-era philosophers of the 
likes of Hobbes and Locke, who advanced individualism as an alternative to the group-
based injustices they saw in feudal society. 
Representation, as considered and practiced currently, reinforces hegemonic 
perspectives and excludes—both actively and passively—marginal discourses. According 
to Carole Pateman (1970), representation in its current form simply will not suffice. 
In Cole’s view existing forms of representation are misrepresentation for 
two reasons. First, because the principle of function has been overlooked, 
the mistake has been made of assuming that it is possible for an individual 
to be represented as a whole and for all purposes instead of his being 
represented in relation to some well-defined function. Second, under the 
existing parliamentary institutions the elector has no real choice of, or 
control over, his representative, and the system actually denies the right of 
the individual to participate because ‘having chosen his representative, the 
ordinary man has, according to that theory, nothing left to do except to let 
other people govern him.’ (p. 37) 
 
The representative structure of contemporary American political life removes people 
from the processes that allegedly aim to benefit them. 
Even in local, supposedly apolitical systems, the individual defines the decision-
making process. Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs), church councils and a plethora of 
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other civic organizations found themselves upon the same principles that shape the 
workings of the U.S. government. More than a competition between ideas or 
philosophies, the tallied vote is held to reflect the will of the people. Individualistic 
representation permeates the entirety of American society and, while opening up 
democratic possibilities unimaginable in previous centuries, forecloses on innovative 
understandings of political society and political capabilities. 
Scholars in the past century have begun to recognize the shortcomings of such a 
conceptualization. With new parts of the population—women, minorities and others—
obtaining the right to vote over the last century, the slow pace or absence of positive 
change in their communities demands a reexamination of the way the United States as a 
country conceives of democracy and representation. While these questions and the 
subsequent studies have undoubtedly moved the scholarly community in a new direction, 




Some political theorists of representation suggest that a group-based approach to 
representation is the best way to further the interests of marginalized communities. 
Through defining what a group is, examining the need for its representation, exploring 
what such a representative might look like and then problematizing group representation, 
this section will explore the strength and weaknesses of this approach to representation. 
Group representation, like individualistic representation, is embedded in a specific 
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discourse. Again, democracy will be best served through a comprehensive representation 
of discourses. 
 
The Constitution of a Group 
According to Iris Marion Young, a defender of group representation, groups are 
established based on meaningful connections that go beyond the individualistic level 
previously explored. Components of this identity include social status, shared history and 
self-identification (Young, 1995, p. 186); furthermore, group members express their 
belonging in relational terms that include exclusion of the “Other” (Young, 1995, p. 187). 
Such a definition of belonging lacks any scientifically objective classification system but 
relies instead on subjective perceptions. What may appear as a weakness to some 
observers fails to alter the existence and operation of these groups, and Young goes even 
further to show that group identification can find itself in the acceptance and celebration 
of external stereotypes. Rather than suggesting autodefinition apart from outside 
influence, Young instead acknowledges the fact that identity often comes from the 
outside in the form of stereotypes that those subject to them then embrace (Young, 1995, 
p. 186). According to Young, groups must portray themselves both as similar enough to 
the majority population to deserve equality and different enough to claim disadvantage 
(Young, 1995, p. 196-7). A group is thus constituted not by a mere meshing together of 
autonomous individuals but the recognition of shared histories, among other things, that 




The Need for Group Representation 
Group representation, though certainly a question of contemporary importance, 
holds a long history in democratic theory. Thomas Hare, an early proponent of 
proportional representation—an electoral parallel to the philosophical group standard—, 
claims that “[a] perfect representation is plainly inconsistent with the exclusion of 
minorities” (Pitkin, 1967, p. 63). Political actors must thus shape institutions of 
democratic representation to provide for greater inclusivity, a quality that itself gives rise 
to significant concerns. The necessity of group representation expresses itself through the 
corresponding necessity of minority representation; that is, as Hare sees it, political 
society requires minority inclusivity, an end that is best achieved through the means of 
group representation. Along the same vein as Hare, Victor Considérant recommends a 
system in which even the wildest views must be represented. Under this understanding of 
group representation, there exists a clearly defined need for the legislature to represent 
the electorate proportionally (Pitkin, 1967, p. 62).  
While these traditional notions of group representation rely upon the orthodox 
discourse of individual representation in existing legislative structures, more recent 
studies have sought to identify both what makes a good group representative and what 
fundamental changes to traditional representation are necessary to achieve fuller 
participation. The proportional representation proffered by past generations of thinkers 
has assumed group homogeneity and an ability to select representatives through voting. It 
has, in short, recognized difference to the point of necessitating special efforts to achieve 
representation but assumed enough sameness to use traditional methods to achieve these 
ends. As explained in the previous section on individual representation, voting is tainted 
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by a Lockean individualistic discourse. The act itself holds an unspoken bias, and 
reliance upon individual electoral population undermines the process of group 
representation. The more contemporary theorists, having accepted the assumptions of 
difference of earlier thinkers, turn to challenge the assertions of sameness that led to 
reliance on individualistic voting. 
The role of undemocratic speech in achieving democratic ends has theoretical 
precedents that suggest a real democratic potential in the incorporation of traditionally 
antidemocratic voices—from unquestionably marginalized communities—into 
deliberation. In one theoretical debate, activism and deliberation find themselves opposed 
one against the other (Young, 2001, p. 671). Deliberation, it is argued, requires rational 
discussion and an aim toward consensus founded upon shared interests in the general 
welfare; activism, on the other hand, rejects rational deliberation and opts instead for one-
sided shouting that undermines the potential for conversation, according to the 
conventional wisdom of deliberative democratic theory. Young, however, questions this 
assumption and arrives at a distinctly different conclusion. Following her logic, protests 
and confrontation represent not an affront on the democratic process; rather, the act of 
making one’s voice heard in a deliberation from which one is excluded grounds itself 
solidly in democratic principles. Moreover, this activist voice belongs not to those in 
power but to the have-nots for whom traditional avenues of participation are not open. 
Such groups, it would seem, gain representation through oppositional, confrontational 
means, rather than through the traditional conduits of representative institutions. 
In attempting to incorporate unheard group voices into the political structure 
itself, Young recommends involving special groups in special ways. Groups must (1) 
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realize collective empowerment, (2) participate in practices of analysis, creation and 
consideration of policy proposals, and (3) receive the right to a minority veto when policy 
questions that are particularly pertinent to group’s interests arise (Young, 1995, p. 189). 
In these ways, traditional democratic institutions learn to incorporate marginalized 
portions of the population and reach for greater inclusiveness than previously 
experienced. 
Theorists of group representation do not seek to give special representation to all 
possible groups. The need arises when groups are oppressed, either by exploitation, 
marginalization, powerlessness, or cultural imperialism (Young, 1995, p. 188). 
According to Young, groups require certain rights within the preexisting individualistic 
structures of representation. Through these special rights, they gain equal access to 
institutions of power and achieve due representation. According to Young’s logic, the 
role of grassroots organizing rests on promoting the interests of particular groups that 
meet certain requirements; however, as this project seeks to demonstrate, organizers 
ought to forego a particularistic politics of minority rights and promote instead 
democracy more holistically through a comprehensive discursive process. 
 
What does a group representative look like? 
Hanna Pitkin, despite her adherence to an individualistic discourse, devotes a 
good part of her book to this group-related question. Descriptive representation, she 
argues, requires the possession of certain characteristics and qualities by the 
representative. John Adams, as cited in Pitkin, claims that a descriptively representative 
body “should be an exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at large, as it should think, 
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feel, reason and act like them” (Pitkin, 1967, p. 60). As such, descriptive characteristics 
determine who represents whom. Pitkin recognizes the obvious questions raised by such 
a claim, for example by calling into question the appropriateness of different 
characteristics’ reproduction (Pitkin, 1967, p. 88).  
Furthermore, this fundamental query addresses not only the selection of which 
characteristics to represent but also the manner in which they find themselves 
represented.  One critic argues that descriptive representation holds certain assumptions, 
many of which may not actually be fair.  
Descriptive representation also makes problematic assumptions about who 
can and who cannot represent minorities. By counting minority elected 
officials and ignoring majority elected officials, descriptive representation 
implicitly assumes that members of the majority group cannot represent 
minority interests (Hajnal, 2009, p. 39).  
 
Faced with this critique, advocates of descriptive group representation simply do not have 
a convincing response. 
Descriptive representation, as conceived by Dovi, does not stand as distinctly 
separated from substantive representation as Pitkin might suggest. For a descriptive 
representative to hold true legitimacy, she must not only resemble the population in 
question but also behave in an appropriate way. Even more basically, Dovi challenges 
Pitkin’s distinction between states of being, as seen in most forms of representation, and 
the active representation that is substantive in nature. Dovi, like Pitkin, finds herself 
embedded in a discourse of representation that limits the philosophical impact of her 
representation theory. Regardless of these distinctions, the real question falls on the 
shoulders of practicality and process. Within the framework of the discursive question at 
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hand, the goodness of a group representative remains qualified by the limited scope of the 
representation to which she subscribes.  
 
The Mechanics of Group Representation 
The fundamental claim of many proponents of group representation centers itself 
on giving a voice to the points of view of marginalized groups. As such, we must first 
investigate, through the lens of representation, why it is important to do this. According 
to Young, marginalized groups interpret policy differently (Young, 1995, p. 183). In the 
deliberative setting, then, the unrepresented voice is not only absent from but also often at 
odds with the mainstream voice of the dominant community. As the marginalized 
understand the political world through a different lens than the rest of society, they must 
then gain special rights in order to make their voices heard. These rights, though, should 
arise not from the perceived position of inferiority of the affected groups in question but 
instead as “a positive assertion of specificity in different forms of life” (Young, 1995, p. 
200). That is, in order to achieve representation following the logic of the group 
discourse, society must acknowledge and affirm the differences that exist within the 
citizenry. Not only is this “positive assertion” key to the realization of representation for 
minority communities, but it also serves to undermine dangers ever-present in 
multicultural, socially stratified and gender-differentiated democratic societies. 
Without recognizing the importance of differences inherent in a pluralistic 
democratic society, several dangers can arise to threaten advances made toward the 
fulfillment of democratic possibility. Cultural assimilation cannot be required for “full 
social participation” (Young, 1995, p. 202). Truly representative societies cannot simply 
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seek to reinforce assimilationist tendencies. Following the insufficient logic and 
discursive challenges of individual representation, it would be adequate to invite poor or 
marginalized individuals to participate in the structure of representation determined by 
the hegemonic discourse of the dominant ethnic group, gender or class provides sufficient 
representation. However, as seen through the lens of group discourse, this view of the 
political world reinforces sameness at the expense of benefits gained from diversity. 
Ultimately, this question rests on the definition of citizenship. As Young sees it, 
citizenship understood as an expression of the general will asserts a politics of 
homogenization (Young, 1995, p. 177). Homogeneity, however, is not the end goal of her 
project, nor should it be; rather, her goal is to better the position of marginalized 
populations by providing them with the representation they need to defend their cultures 
and unique forms of life. This practice does not only serve to advantage the 
disadvantaged but provides for a more democratic space that in the end will benefit 
everyone. By exposing the dominant groups to new understandings of the political world 
in which their members live, fuller representation can in effect create more 
democratically minded, purposefully reflective individuals. “For unless confronted with 
different perspectives on social relations and events, different values and languages, most 
people tend to assert their own perspective as universal” (Young, 1995, p. 190). Thus, by 
confronting the dominant groups with the same reality that marginalized groups must 
face on a constant basis—the reality of differing ways of seeing the world—, group 
representation opens society to new possibilities. 
For the sake of clarification, it is useful to return again to the model city presented 
earlier in this chapter. The city has now done away with individual representation and has 
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adopted a group representation orientation. Where the individual once behaved as the 
supreme political unit, groups now characterize the political process. As such, the 
primary struggle is not between individuals’ conflicting interests but instead between 
groups. An ethnic minority group can now speak as a political player in its own right, 
apart from the interests of individuals who compose the group. For example, Native 
Americans, who often have a unique perspective on environmental issues, will have the 
opportunity to speak as a group on questions of environmental policy. Political officials 
speak on behalf of the groups they represent and work to resolve conflict between groups. 
When a worker makes known a grievance against her supervisor, the struggle shows itself 
as one between labor and management; likewise, when a white police officer fires upon a 
black suspect, the question turns to group relations between the European- and African-
American groups—or quite possibly law enforcement and minorities more broadly 
defined. Group politics, rather than individualistic liberalism, characterize the social 
discourse, and group representation continues to confront injustices disregarded by 
individual representation’s incomplete understanding of political reality. 
 
Problematizing Group Representation 
While group representation has provided advocates of social, economic and 
political equality a conduit through which to criticize unjust practices of representation, 
with it come several problems that deserve attention. In identifying the weaknesses of the 
group-level model of representation, the following section will expose potential areas of 
improvement from which later chapters can build more comprehensive arguments. Group 
representation, it will be demonstrated, relies upon a particular group discourse. 
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Iris Young herself acknowledges multiple problems with a group-based approach 
to representation without offering adequate solutions. For example, since individuals 
typically have multiple group identifications, how can they be assembled into groups that 
can have distinct representation? This conception of group representation falls back on 
the old model of individual representation that has proved inadequate in bettering 
marginalized communities. Individuals’ identification with the group and not on the 
group itself serves as the primary point of analysis. The representation of groups 
therefore speaks to another level of organization within the individual-based discourse 
rather than an entirely new discursive form. While some theorists do offer unique 
twists—such as the minority veto in policy decisions that affect those groups—, group 
representation on the whole fails to move beyond individualism in any significant way. 
A second, equally problematic theoretical issue finds itself in the possibility of 
cross-representation between different groups. As most contemporary group 
representation theorists claim, group identity is founded upon shared histories of 
suffering; however, in seeking to apply this basic definitional distinction to 
representation, one comes across the issue of contradictory identities. In short, members 
of one group can hold perspectives of another; therefore, anyone can represent the 
interests of any group (Dovi, 2002, p. 732). In modern American society, a Latina who 
grew up in a predominately African-American neighborhood could identify with and 
understand intimately the shared history of suffering associated with that minority group, 
but she would not descriptively represent the community of which she is a part. Her 
speaking on behalf of the African American community may not be seen as legitimate by 
some. This scenario grows even more complicated when looking at people’s actual ethnic 
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heritages. In the country’s major cities, not only does one observe a wide range of 
ethnicities but also a great variety in the distribution of those ethnicities. Who 
descriptively represents someone with as mixed a heritage as many Americans have? 
Descriptive representation may appear straightforward but simply does not account for 
the true diversity in modern American communities. 
In discursive terms, group representation brings some identities to light while 
minimizing others. The discourse of group representation forces the same 
homogenization and hegemonization within “groups” that it seeks to deconstruct amongst 
different groups. Those who come to represent groups cannot embody the fullness of the 
discourses contained within those groups and therefore diminish the quality of the 
representation. In practice, members of the female gender group who come to represent 
women on the whole tend to represent more specifically white, middle-class women. In 
group representation, similar scenarios present themselves throughout and call to 
question the true representative nature of those representatives. Only discursive 
representation prevents any intragroup hegemonization by giving voice to every 
perspective no matter how unpopular the view might be. 
 Most significantly, group representation finds itself making self-exempting claims 
of discourse influence. When Iris Young points to the unacknowledged biases of systems 
under individual representation, she is basically proffering a discursive critique; however, 
at the same time, she fails to recognize the same limitations of the discourse inherent in 
her proposed account of group representation. Rather than address the issue—although an 
argument of true impartiality would be difficult to make—, Young is either unaware of 
the second edge of the philosophical sword she wields or opts to ignore the concern for 
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simplicity’s sake. Ultimately, the unanswered question comes down to this: if the 
philosopher(s) who developed Theory A did so within a certain discourse, failing to 
account fully for external discourses, what would lead an observer to believe that Theory 
B is not subject to the same narrowness of scope as well? In questions of group 
representation, complex claims are made against the alleged universality of the discourse 
of liberal-individualistic representation.  
Group representation fails to relieve thinkers of these concerns but instead 
exchanges one set of limitations for another. Where theorists of individual representation 
find themselves bound by the discourse inherent in Enlightenment liberal thought, group 
representation theorists find themselves similarly limited by their own discourses, which 
single out specific historically disempowered groups to favor with veto power and other 
guarantees. Their analyses do not represent impartial examinations in search of universal 
truths but instead discourse-embedded examples of biased theory. 
With these problems threatening the democratic potential of group representation, 
another option seems needed. By overcoming the inherent inequality of individual 
representation, group representation offers new insight into the democratic possibility of 
society but fails to provide a path by which to fulfill it. This new form of representation 
must then account not only for the shortcomings of group representation theoretically but 
also lay a groundwork from which practical expressions of equality can arise. 
 
Comprehensive Discursive Representation 
 While Pitkin offers multiple conceptions of representation and Young suggests 
the representation of group identities as a means of addressing social ills, nothing has yet 
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sufficiently met the challenges of this thesis’ discursive critique. Through the 
representation of discourses, oppressed minorities—and voiceless perspectives, more 
generally—can find a means of making themselves heard in the public arena. In order to 
understand better this concept of discourse representation, the following pages will 
differentiate the roles of different types of discourses, offer a model of representation and 
then critique its practical forms. The comprehensive form of discourse representation 
aims not to promote any particularized interests nor does it operate from any single 




All discourses conform to a certain mold; they enable and constrain thought, 
speech and action (Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2008, p. 482). In doing so, discourses serve 
practically to create frames of reference from which individuals cannot escape. 
Hegemonic discourses have certain unique qualities that set them apart from other 
discourses. What stands out is the relation of those who comprise the dominant discourse 
to others in society and the relation between discourses themselves. Most fundamentally, 
discursive hegemony oppresses part of society while raising others to positions of power. 
“Dominant discourses embody privilege and power” (Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2008, p. 488). 
The subtle but all-consuming role played by privilege in society reaches the very core of 
injustice and oppression. In democratic policymaking settings, if left unchecked, 
dominant discourses prevent consideration of all possible interests and promote biases 
(Young, 1995, p. 177). For the sake of a more democratic society, political players ought 
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to neutralize these biases through the introduction of alternative discourses to the public 
debate. 
At the other end of the spectrum, marginal discourses find themselves playing an 
important role. Not only are they important to democratic equality as a balance against 
forces of dominance, but marginal discourses also present unrepresented perspectives. 
Embedded in what James Scott calls “hidden transcripts,” marginalized discourses 
present themselves in brief glimmers on the sideline of society, away from the 
surveillance of the hegemonic. “Hidden transcript represents discourse—gesture, speech, 
practices—that is normally excluded from the public transcript of subordinates by the 
exercise of power” (Scott, 2007, p. 202). Through this differentiation of discourses and 
the roles they play, it becomes evident that discourses can be the windows into more 
democratic forms of representation. 
 
Representing Discourses 
With an understanding of discourses in place, the student of representation can 
focus on the act of representing discourses. Through discursive representation, specific 
political questions find resolution in the intersection of the demands of different 
discourses. While Dryzek conceives of a Chamber of Discourses to achieve political 
outcomes, the true work of discursive representation reveals itself in very different terms 
and very different venues. Of particular interest is the use of discourse representation in 
the promotion of democracy within American society at the grassroots level. 
An important distinction between the comprehensive approach to discursive 
representation and its more limited form must be made from the start. Comprehensive 
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discursive representation seeks to bring to the table all relevant discourses. Dryzek’s 
Chamber of Discourses, conceptually at least, serves as an example of the comprehensive 
approach, as it does not promote any particular point of view but incorporates multiple 
discourses in the representative process. It is comprehensive in the sense that it aims to be 
as open and inclusive as possible to all relevant discourses. Limited discursive 
representation, on the other hand, operates with the same notion of discourses but does 
not make the necessary leap to adopt a philosophy of inclusivity. It concerns itself only 
with the promotion of a single discourse. To borrow from Dryzek and Niemeyer, Bono’s 
interpretation of the discourse of African continent can be seen as an example of limited 
discursive representation. In representing the sub-Saharan discourse, Bono adds another 
voice to the debate but does not fundamentally change the representative process. This 
distinction will play itself out further in the next chapter, as some grassroots nonprofits 
engage in limited discursive representation but none go so far as to adopt the 
comprehensive approach. 
As discourse cuts to the core of both individual and group identities and, as 
previously discussed, shapes perceptions of reality in significant ways, the appropriation 
and redistribution of the interests associated with a discourse brings with it a certain level 
of understandable concern. Discourse representation reflects itself politically on a regular 
basis in attempts to reconcile conflicting points of view; for example, the modern Right 
and Left find themselves not only contested substantially but also seeking to represent a 
plethora of varying discourses. While arguably not discourses in and of themselves, the 
ideologies typical of the oversimplified political climate of contemporary times do 
represent discourses. The Left does not embody on its own any lens through which its 
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members view the world but instead represents a variety of discourses, many of which 
may overlap onto one another: the labor, civil rights, ethnic minority, social justice, and 
environmental discourses, among others. Similarly, the Right does not penetrate on its 
own the very essence of frame-forming discourses; rather, the ideological amalgam seeks 
to represent discourses of rugged individualism and boot straps, libertarianism, religious 
fundamentalism and other forms of social conservativism. By attempting to create 
common ground around such a wide and varied coalition of discourses, these camps tend 
to represent poorly—if at all—the discourses that shape the perspectives of their 
partisans. Discursive representation must not submit to the dichotomization present in 
contemporary U.S. politics but, at the same time, should not relegate itself to strictly 
academic theoretical inquiries. 
The metropolis that has, since the start of this chapter, adopted both individual 
and group forms of representation turns now to this final theory. Metropolitan politics 
defined by discourses seeks to answer broader questions, and issues arise as conflicts 
between competing perspectives. The labor-management question, originally described as 
a disagreement between an individual employee and her supervisor, does not center 
around two distinct groups; instead, it brings to light a conflict between two ways of 
interpreting the world—conflict between two lenses through which all political reality is 
understood. The labor discourse draws upon a shared history of exploitation at the hands 
of capital-holders, makes use of class distinctions to explain injustice and inequality and 
defines political realities in their entireties along those class lines. The management 
discourse, on the other hand, emphasizes societal efficiency achieved through effective 
use of human capital, appreciates employees’ labor as a component of production. 
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Without making value judgments, discursive representation permits a recognition of and 
exchange between these perception-influencing forces. Previous attempts to address these 
issues through forms of group representation fail to speak to these deep questions and 
touch instead only on their superficial characteristics. By addressing conflicts within this 
framework, the city can better negotiate lasting resolution rather than provide case-by-
case temporary solutions. 
 
A Critique of Discursive Representation 
 Discursive representation, as developed by Dryzek and Niemeyer, presents certain 
insurmountable problems and requires serious rethinking in order to establish a solid 
theory that is both philosophically and practically sound. The major difficulties evident in 
their understanding of discourse representation are (1) its level of generality, (2) the 
operationalization of such a concept and (3) the absence of the human element within the 
theory’s most basic tenets. As such, significant thought must go towards the 
reconstruction of discursive representation into a theory capable of reaching its full 
democratic potential. 
 While presenting a compelling case for discourse representation in a 
fundamentally theoretical framework, Dryzek fails to define the scope for his assertions 
and creates a theory of uncertain generality. The scope varies from the very broad to the 
extremely specific. The article begins with the example of Bono’s representation of the 
African continent, thus establishing a broad scope. No particular issue or policy area 
receives consideration in this first example, but other parts of the article present 
significantly more issue-specific readings of discourse representation. When describing 
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the functions of the Chamber of Discourses, the authors give examples of environmental 
issues and other questions of a more limited nature. Juxtaposed with the all-
encompassing scale of a single Irish superstar representing the entirety of the African 
continent, these issue-specific discursive chambers simply do not compare. The levels of 
generality vary greatly, and the writers fail to account for this variation.  
The extension in scope of discursive representation to the extremely general 
levels invites other problems as well. The idea of Bono justly representing the interests of 
an entire continent goes against our considered judgments. Such high-profile acts of 
representation do not properly capture the heart of discursive representation. Moreover, 
as argued previously in this chapter, Bono’s representation of the African discourse fails 
to meet the standard of comprehensive discourse representation and provides instead only 
a limited form. As the next chapter will argue, comprehensive discursive representation 
should deal with all matters of social life through low-profile grassroots channels of 
political society. The scope of comprehensive discursive representation then ought to be 
more specific and local, rather than broad and international. 
Operationally, the original theorists of discursive representation imagine a 
Chamber of Discourses in which all discourses—even those without adherents in the area 
in question—receive equal time and consideration. In short, this would be difficult to 
implement. For example, the representation of discourses in this setting relies upon the 
action of individuals who can embody a single discourse and consciously minimize the 
effects of other discourses on their decision-making. By entrusting the representation of 
discourses to individual beings, the theory essentially reverts to the individualistic by 
relying on the rational intellectual capacities of individuals to decide which facets of their 
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beings—i.e. discourses—to present to the external world. Discursive representation, in 
this case, grounds itself in an individual-based discourse, which acknowledges discourse 
competition but leaves it to the individual to decide these matters on an internal basis. 
What was originally intended to move away from both individual- and group-level 
representation for the sake of giving voice to unheard discourses undermines its own 
foundation by relying upon just such a discourse as the hinge pin of its implementation. 
Practically speaking, discursive representation is most easily implemented at the 
local level. Without going into greater detail, as this question will receive further 
treatment in later chapters, suffice it to say that this form of representation does not 
require a formal chamber or even a semiofficial exchange of ideas. Discourses, embedded 
in the very core of both individuals and groups, can be represented in much less formal—
and far more useful—ways. 
Implementation is further complicated in Dryzek’s operationalization of discourse 
representation by his inclusion of discourses lacking adherents. Even if a discourse has no 
one in the polity who holds it, Dryzek says that it still ought to be included in the debate. 
In practical terms, having dismissed the idea of a Chamber of Discourses, only relevant 
discourses present in the community need representation. How else can a process of 
representation remain both local and comprehensive? In order to realize comprehensive 
discursive representation, this thesis abandons Dryzek’s otherwise inconsequential 
requirement in favor of a more participatory process through which discourses are 
represented by those who hold them. This process will be discussed in the final chapter. 
 Finally, discursive representation as presented by Dryzek and Niemeyer removes 
people from the democratic equation. In an attempt to democratize a representative 
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system that fails to account for the fullness of human identity, these theorists actually 
eliminate an element essential to the democratic nature of representation. According to a 
recent critique by Swedish writer Sofia Näsström, the central problem with discursive 
representation lies in its recognition of the primacy of a nonhuman entity over countable 
human beings. In her examination of the discursive theorists’ choice to represent 
nonhuman elements, read with some pointed philosophical exaggeration, she points to the 
very nature of this project’s critique of Dryzek.  
What gets lost in this model is the essential historicity or openness of 
democracy. By dismantling the people as the authority of democracy 
discursive representation banishes the indeterminacy that comes with the 
democratic experience. Since it is possible to scientifically identify the 
relevant discourses in society there is no reason to hear people out. In this 
respect, the experimentation with the meaning of democracy endorsed by 
Dryzek is a privilege reserved for scientists, not for citizens. Nothing 
could be more comforting, but also more worrying for the convinced 
democrats that we are (Näsström, 2009, p. 24). 
 
Näsström claims that their shift from popular to scientific validation of representative 
institutions undermines democracy and thus endangers the representative process it 
claims to promote.  
Since the discursive representative cannot ascend to power through any kind of 
popular electoral contest, Näsström contends, Dryzek and Niemeyer assign to analytical 
scientists the job of determining which discourses receive representation and who 
represents them. In the same way that the American public has begun to defer to experts 
when presented with nuanced or complicated policy matters, Dryzek and Niemeyer’s 
discursive representation defers to experts on the most foundational questions of the 
democratic experience. This fundamental shift threatens representation on the whole and 
endangers democracy. 
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As Näsström understands it, people no longer matter under Dryzek’s model of 
representation. Explored above, concerns also loom over the operationalization and 
generalizability of their proposition. However, the representation of discourses, when 
removed from the problematic framework put in place by these original theorists, does in 
fact hold promise in the context of community organizing. Despite these notable 
challenges, comprehensive discursive representation nevertheless stands out as a jumping 
point from which the causes of democracy might be furthered. 
 
Conclusion 
Many advocates of individual and group representation claim that their positions 
are grounded in objective reality. However, discourses in fact constitute both forms of 
representation. While it is not possible to avoid discourses, it is possible to create a 
democratic arena where discourses are represented. The next chapter explores examples 
of how individual, group and discursive representation have been embraced by specific 
community organizing non-profits. It will demonstrate that these organizations should 
































This chapter will examine examples of how individual, group and discursive 
representation have each been adopted and practiced by grassroots community 
organizers. Categorizing these organizations according to the theory of representation to 
which each is committed provides insights into their understandings of democracy and 
the strategies for achieving it. 
It is important to draw again a sharp distinction between “limited” and 
“comprehensive” discursive representation. Organizers who represent a single or narrow 
range of discourses are practicing limited discursive representation; organizers who seek 
to represent all relevant discourses are practicing comprehensive discursive 
representation. As argued in the previous chapter, all representatives, including those of 
both individuals and groups, practice limited discursive representation. However, the goal 
for organizers should be to represent all discourses—in effect, to practice comprehensive 
discursive organizing. 
 
Three Major Approaches to Organizing 
In the analysis that follows, the Association of Community Organizations for 
Reform Now (ACORN) will serve as an example of individual representation. The Direct 
Action and Research Training Center (DART) and the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) 
will exemplify the group-based representative discourse. The U.S. Public Interest 
Research Group affiliates (PIRGs) practice limited discursive representation. However, it 
is important to note that none of these organizations fits its category perfectly, and that 
some—including the Virginia Organizing Project—draw heavily on all three approaches 
to representation. The following discussion will include brief summaries of the work of 
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community organizing groups, thorough explanations of their organizing philosophies, 
and an exploration of the connections between them and the theories of representation to 
which each is committed. 
 
ACORN and Individual Representation 
 Adopting the discourse most common throughout American social institutions, 
ACORN operates within a fundamentally individualistic understanding of representation. 
In the same manner that legislative bodies and many civic institutions consider 
themselves an amalgamation of individual voices with autonomous self interests, 
ACORN sets as its primary mission the inclusion of previously unheard individual voices 
into the political debate. Composed of individual community members acting together for 
shared goals and in their own self-interest, the group seeks to convert that potential into 
fuel for real, meaningful social change. While maintaining active neighborhood 
associations empowered to make demands, stage demonstrations and raise lobbying 
funds on behalf of their members, ACORN focuses the bulk of its work on increasing 
participation at the individual level. As such, the organization focuses primarily on voter 
registration and empowerment as its means of achieving social justice. 
ACORN explains its fundamentally individualistic mission on the organization’s 
Web site. 
Registering to vote is one of the first steps toward becoming a full 
participant in American democracy and a citizen who can influence 
change in a community.  ACORN members and workers go door to door 
in low- and moderate income neighborhoods, approach people at shopping 
centers, grocery stores, and libraries, and visit high schools to talk to 
voting-age seniors because ACORN wants as many people as possible to 
participate in the democratic process. ACORN has helped more than 1.68 
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million citizens to register to vote in past registration drives leading up to 
the 2004 and 2006 elections.  For the 2008 election, ACORN intends to 
help 1.2 million people register to vote in 26 states across the country.  We 
have already reached 177,000 registrations in 2007 and 2008 in what will 
be the largest, non-partisan voter registration effort in U.S. history 
(acorn.com). 
 
ACORN’s basic goal is to increase the influence of low- and moderate income citizens by 
encouraging individual-level electoral participation. This implies both that organizers 
should restrict their efforts to specific segments of the population and that the best way to 
represent these groups is through individual-level mechanisms. 
 The representation of poor and working class individuals is not only a question of 
nominal commitment. ACORN concerns itself with the very particularized interests of 
these individuals. In citing the ACORN Community Organizing Model, Gary Delgado 
(1986) emphasizes the individualistic leaning of the organization. “The model has as its 
goal the building of a ‘mass community organization’ able to develop ‘sufficient 
organizational power to achieve its individual members’ interests...’” (p. 63). This focus 
on individual interests leaves little room for the organization to speak to issues of 
democratic possibility. ACORN organizers seek to embody “both a poor people's interest 
group and part of a broad populist movement for social change” (Swartz, 2007, p. 134). 
As an interest group, it can do little to promote democracy more broadly. Instead, it aims 
to “deliver tangible benefits to members of the organization” (Delgado, 1986, p. 90). In 
these respects, ACORN resembles other interest groups with little distinction. Interest 
groups, by definition, are limited in scope. Accordingly, ACORN can engage only in 
limited representation of individual interests and cannot promote any form of 
comprehensive discursive representation. 
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While problematic in light of this project, an organizing philosophy based in an 
individualistic discourse does have practical benefits. Most significantly, this perspective 
permits ACORN to communicate effectively with other institutions of similar 
individualistic leanings. When an organizer or lobbyist confronts an elected 
representative with the backing of a certain number of individuals—presented physically 
as a mass demonstration, symbolically through verified signatures on a petition or 
statistically as a large bloc of committed votes—, the politician and organizer share a 
common language within the realm of electoral politics. In what often seems a tense 
relationship, the facility of dialogue that is made possible by the mutual understanding, 
employment and valuation of individual representation serves to bridge the chasm 
between grassroots organizer and elected official. Local, state and national 
representatives understand political reality through an individual perspective; therefore, 
should an organizer from the group or limited discursive schools of organizing approach 
those representatives with constituent-backed concerns, the dialogue would not flow as 
smoothly. In this sense, ACORN maintains a significant advantage over organizations 
grounded in group or discourse organizing philosophies. 
 The individualistic approach, while facilitating inter-institutional communication, 
also forecloses upon some of the possibilities of community organizing. A relentlessly 
individualistic discourse fails to challenge the status quo in sufficiently meaningful ways. 
By making the overarching struggle—the organization’s very reason for existence—one 
defined primarily by individuals, ACORN may have difficulty speaking out against 
injustice in different forms. While groups like ACORN may not have any problem 
working against unfair voting laws or demanding higher pay for services its members 
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provide, the nature of their work undermines attempts to make broader statements on 
other relevant issues. 
For example, racial profiling is not an individual issue. It has no place in an 
individual-based discourse but is nevertheless a problem that affects the population 
ACORN targets to mobilize. No individual community member falls victim to this 
injustice due to his or her personal qualities as a distinct solitary individual; rather, law 
enforcement targets an entire racial or ethnic group, the members of which are not 
distinguished one from another. While racial profiling does profoundly affect some of the 
individuals with whom ACORN seeks to work, this group will always be a minority in 
the electorate as a whole. By not providing a structure for this section of the population to 
participate as a group, the electorate as a whole will not be able to benefit from unique 
minority point of view. The example of racial profiling proves that the individualistic 
approach does not provide comprehensive solutions to the all of society’s ills. The 
classical liberal understanding of political society as composed of autonomous 
individuals does not stand the test of community organizing’s challenges, neither within 
ACORN’s own understanding of its mission as one focused on the furthering of certain 
interests nor within this paper’s objective to promote democracy as a comprehensive 
whole. By committing themselves to the sometimes narrow lens of individual 
representation and interest-influenced oppositional campaigns, such groups cannot speak 
out on these larger issues.  
ACORN’s self-definition along the lines of individual representation not only 
affects its issue selection but also preempts its ability to empower local communities to 
engage in comprehensive representative exercises. In making the transition from 
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disparate local groups to a well-oiled centralized machine, one author argues, the 
organization essentially squashed differing opinions. This move foreclosed on the 
democratic potential inherent in opposition and challenge and created what is today a top-
down activation machine. 
The strategy has probably ‘worked’ in terms of success-ACORN retains a 
great many active members and exercises a certain influence on local 
policies-but it has failed in Tocquevillean terms. Would-be participants 
now know, or should know, that dissenting opinions are not welcome; that 
the lead organizers squandered the chance to examine their own world 
views; and that the leadership has made it clear that political influence 
takes precedence over the development of independent viewpoints (Sabl, 
2002, p. 14).  
 
The educative function of organizing loses value, as the organization hierarchy chooses 
to push its own agenda rather that allow for the establishment of different priorities in 
different localities throughout the United States. 
While this approach to the historic transformation of ACORN into a centralized 
power broker explains the seemingly undemocratic position of the national organization 
as a product of strong-handed organizers, the root of these problems finds itself in the 
individualistic understanding of the political process. When an organizer sees the political 
world through an individualistic lens, it becomes unproblematic for that person to assume 
that he or she can assume the majoritarian position and lead without constraints. The 
centralization of decision-making authority undoubtedly contributed to the organization’s 
top-down approach to community engagement, but only through ACORN’s appropriation 
of an individualistic discourse was such a move even possible. 
 Furthermore, in terms of the critical organizing question of mobilization or 
activation, ACORN’s reliance upon a discourse of individual representation leads it to 
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fall squarely on the side of the latter. In Steven E. Schier’s (2000) account of political 
exclusivity in the twentieth century, he seeks to clarify the ambiguity between these two 
terms. Activation, Schier contends, involves elite decision-makers manipulating the 
masses to gain support for the decision they have already made. This form of popular 
action is evidenced by the rise of candidates at the expense of parties (Schier, 2000, p. 
24). Where local party organizations historically engaged citizens in establishing policy 
priorities and decision-making activities, candidate-driven campaigns now seek to 
activate individual citizens on their behalf, without the expectation of a genuine dialogue 
where the grassroots can have an impact on party positions and strategies. 
Mobilization, on the other hand, involves moving people to act for themselves. 
Accomplished within organization constructs, mass mobilization differentiates itself from 
activation through its interactive nature; rather than establishing a set agenda, those who 
seek to mobilize rely instead on a give-and-take in which authority leaves itself open to 
challenge and opportunities exist for the mobilized to become the mobilizers. ACORN’s 
organizing philosophy, however, most clearly resembles an activation approach to social 
change. While Schier clearly explains the negative consequences of activation and its 
incompatibility with democratic thought, his practical assessment of activation speaks 
against the ACORN approach to community organizing. “[A]bout one-half of all 
members of the public are difficult candidates for activation. They rank lower in 
education and occupy social networks far from politics and power. Any activation 
strategy with such a group is likely to be high in cost and involve modest results” (Schier, 
2000, p. 32). The Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, an adherent 
to the individualistic discourse of representation and activation over mobilization, finds 
Belanger 39 
itself philosophically and practically out of step with its stated purpose of real, lasting 
social change.  
 
DART and IAF: Group Organizing Philosophy 
 The Direct Action Research and Training Center, founded in 1982, and the 
Industrial Areas Foundation rely on a group representation in the formation and 
justification of their organizing philosophy. While local organizations with ACORN 
affiliations compose themselves of individuals recruited primarily through canvasses, 
both DART and IAF have adopted a congregational approach to community organizing 
originally pioneered by Saul Alinksy, the founder of the IAF. The congregational 
approach seeks to include in organizations’ membership local expressions of established 
religious organizations rather than individual community members. In following this 
philosophy, organizers move away from the individualistic and more toward group 
representation theory. The recognition of the group as the constituent unit of grassroots 
organizing facilitates mobilization and membership growth but complicates the process 
of representation and ultimately cannot respond to the challenges that arose in the above 
discussion of ACORN’s individualistic organizing model. 
As a group-based discourse does not fit well within the dominant American 
discourse of individualism, past commentators have on occasion failed to convey the 
appropriate image of DART and IAF organizing practices. In some of the previous 
literature, theorists have misrepresented the true organizing philosophy of these 
organizations. In his chapter on the Texas branch of IAF, Benjamin Marquez (1993) 
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incorrectly grounds his analysis of the Industrial Areas Foundation in a pluralist 
incarnation of an individual-based discourse.  
According to the pluralist school, individuals are independent decision 
makers who are free to participate in local politics whenever they judge it 
in their interests to do so. Group membership is overlapping and follows 
no rigid class pattern, and organizations usually dissipate once the issues 
that brought the group together are resolved (p. 128). 
 
This picture of IAF organizing does not do the organization justice. It is portrayed 
essentially as a temporary collection of individuals; however, as shown by Iris Young in 
the previous chapter, group definition goes far beyond mere association and involves 
shared historical ties that bind the group together (Young, 1995, p. 186). IAF organizers 
do not work with short-term, passing amalgamations of individual interests. The groups 
with which they work are much more deeply rooted than Marquez would make them 
seem. Despite the failure of some commentators to recognize the group-based discourse 
in which IAF organizers embed themselves, others are more ready to recognize the role 
of group representation in IAF organizing. In describing IAF’s work, one article claims 
that “[i]ndividual empowerment, or the empowerment of whole groups, for that matter, is 
a means for achieving democracy” (Altemose & McCarty, 2001, p. 139). While these 




 The congregational approach makes it possible for the organizer to work with 
concrete, pre-established group in a community rather than being forced to develop her 
own mental construct of the group with which she intends to work. By composition, faith 
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congregations meet Iris Young’s requirements for groups; the shared history, deep-
seeded commonalities and recognition of one another as companions evident between 
group members form bonds that create opportune situations for grassroots organizers 
(Young, 1995, p. 186). Furthermore, shared qualities among members of faith-defined 
groups often create within that community other group memberships. For example, many 
congregations who participate in community organizing initiatives are predominately 
African American. Poverty, poor education or substandard housing may, depending on 
other characteristics of the congregation, characterize the lives of its members. From 
these vantage points—clearly nonreligious but derived from an unmistakably faith-
influenced setting—, organizers can move people to action along group lines. 
There are other benefits to this organizational form of group definition. 
Community organizing philosophies with a stronger emphasis on organizational 
membership benefit significantly from the pre-existing social structures which provide a 
foundation for the work at hand. Instead of building an entirely new civic institution from 
the ground up—membership, reputation and effectiveness, included—, DART and IAF 
employ institutions already in existence in order to achieve goals of shared interest. In 
Robert Putnam’s (2000) terms, organizers seek out social capital. While the wealthy have 
privileged access to land and industrial capital, poor communities that community 
organizations tend to target in their mobilization strategies nevertheless have their own 
privileged access to social capital. For the organizer, then, it simply makes sense to create 
campaigns around these useful sources of social capital.  
The Industrial Areas Foundation, the institutional grandfather of all community 
organizing ventures, has experienced transformation over the decades but has maintained 
Belanger 42 
its group-oriented nature throughout. Here, a historical note might help to clarify and 
sharpen the point. When Saul Alinsky first founded the original IAF in Chicago, labor 
was strong. An experienced labor organizer himself, Alinsky’s work in communities 
surrounding plants and factories was as an extension of his in-shop activities. The capital 
at his disposal was labor; now, well over a half-century later, labor has lost its might. 
Faced with the decline of industry and its associated parts, organizers like Alinsky who 
originally relied upon union power as their social capital must now turn to different 
sources. The fundamentals, however, remain the same. “A major revolution to be won in 
the immediate future is the dissipation of man’s illusion that his own welfare can be 
separate from that of all others” (Alinsky, 1971, p. 23). Like Putnam, Alinsky places an 
unmistakable emphasis on the power found in people coming together around shared 
causes. In modern American life, one of the few remaining reserves of such capital lies in 
faith congregations; accordingly, organizations like IAF and DART have adapted the 
older philosophies of labor-centered organizing to include churches, mosques and 
synagogues in the wider plan for social change. 
In Texas, a branch of the IAF exemplifies particularly well the philosophy’s 
departure from Alinsky’s original plan for the organization. Where Alinsky concerned 
himself primarily with self-interest and short issue campaigns, Ernie Cortez, one of the 
most prominent IAF developers of the congregation-based model of organizing, 
emphasizes self-interest combined with sets of value commitments and long-term 
community organizations (Warren, 2001, p. 58). Furthermore, the relational organizing 
taught and practiced by the IAF centers not around action on any single issue but instead 
aims to engage people’s value commitments in their communities (Warren, 2001, p. 51). 
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Individual citizens’ participation and activity within the organization is decided not solely 
by their individual desire or drive but also by pure group affiliation. By incorporating 
these deep value commitments into the work of justice, the IAF model seeks to embody 
the core components that define people’s membership in the organization. By taking into 
account entire sets of value commitments, which serve to define identity and group 
affiliations at the deepest level, the Industrial Areas Foundations employs a group-
oriented organizing model that makes possible long-lasting involvement on the part of 
member organizations. 
Beyond any social capital-derived justifications for the incorporation of faith-
based communities into the equation of community organizing, the shared history of 
many faith traditions does maintain unmistakable social justice slants. Christian churches 
consistently bemoan the plight of the poor; organizing gives legs to their concerns. In 
participant churches, the action of the organizer on the streets supplements the words of 
the preacher from the pulpit, and the two together create and employ a powerful instance 
of group definition. By embracing a philosophy of group representation, both DART and 
IAF ensure a ready supply of well-defined groups for its organizing activities and reaches 
out within those religious communities to address questions of interest in a secular 
setting. Through group definition, the discourse of group representation makes itself 
evident in the realm of community organizing. 
 
The Introduction of a New Intermediary 
 While group representation does simplify the job of the organizer by defining and 
making available a preexistent community with which to work, the practical task of 
representation becomes increasingly difficult the further the organizing philosophy gets 
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from the individualistic discourse. In the case of ACORN, wherein the essential citizen-
to-representative relationship remains intact, organizers work as individuals to empower 
other individuals to initiate that relationship without fundamentally altering its nature. 
Though a brute simplification of the organizing process, organizers could be said to 
introduce the previously disempowered individual to her representative, provide her with 
the tools necessary to maintain that contact and then step out of the picture; the 
representational system remains intact, only briefly disrupted by the arrival and 
subsequent departure of the organizer from the scene.  
Community organizing that draws on the discourse of group representation, on the 
other hand, operates from a very different world view. Rather than work to make the 
individual-to-individual connection work more for the oppressed, organizers rethink 
representation entirely by changing the players; citizen and representative may become 
“African American community” and “Government,” for example. Rather than individuals 
confronting individuals—a justice-oriented voter cancelling the vote of a supporter of the 
status quo or a worker confronting her supervisor—, the DART and IAF position 
themselves to speak more broadly from a group perspective to a social justice or class-
critical discourse.  In addition, organizers themselves also play representative roles. They 
will frequently meet with local politicians, albeit joined by “community leaders,” to make 
demands of and negotiate with local officials. The organizer adds herself to the 
representative equation; in doing so, the institutionalized form of representation becomes 
more indirect and displaced. 
With that said, this shift to an organization-oriented model of representation 
initiated by group-focused organizing philosophies does offer certain benefits. In this 
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fundamental shift, DART and organizations like it gain the capacity to speak to issues of 
injustice inaccessible through the liberal democratic discourse of individualism. While 
less compatible with the vocabulary and conceptualization of representation common in 
U.S. politics, group-oriented organizing does nevertheless win victories that would 
otherwise remain unattainable. The DART and IAF approach to organizing underlines 
both the benefits and risks of confronting the hegemonic discourse of individual 
representation. Group-based organizing falls short of promoting democracy in its fullest 
sense because it does not account for the role of discourse and continues to promote the 
particularized interests of specific groups. As such, it fails to support a comprehensive 
representation of discourses in the community. 
  
Limited Discursive Representation and Group-less Movements 
 Where ACORN registers voters and DART mobilizes religious congregations for 
causes of justice, certain movements aim to represent particular discourses. By 
subscribing to a discursive framework, an organization empowers itself to make broader 
claims and enter into a more universal struggle; however, the limited nature of this 
embodiment of discursive representation prevents these organizations from becoming 
true promoters of comprehensive democracy. The most notable attribute of limited 
discursive representation in the realm of local activism is its detachment from people. 
While both individual- and group-based forms of organizing have an intractable human 
element, the limited discursive approach is characterized by the absence of a connection 
to people. 
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 The U.S. Public Interest Research Group stands out as an organization grounded 
in a limited discursive philosophy of organizing. Statewide affiliates of the national 
organization, state PIRGs seek to promote the “public interest” over private interests. As 
opposed to the group-based representation theory presented in the previous section, this 
embodiment of discourse-based representation aims to represent not any particular group 
but instead the discourse of the “public interest.” 
U.S. PIRG is an advocate for the public interest. When consumers are 
cheated, or the voices of ordinary citizens are drowned out by special 
interest lobbyists, U.S. PIRG speaks up and takes action. We uncover 
threats to public health and well-being and fight to end them, using the 
time-tested tools of investigative research, media exposés, grassroots 
organizing, advocacy and litigation. U.S. PIRG's mission is to deliver 
persistent, result-oriented public interest activism that protects our health, 
encourages a fair, sustainable economy, and fosters responsive, 
democratic government (uspirg.org). 
 
While the limited discursive representation of the “public interest” does involve a human 
element—the “public”—, it nevertheless stands out from both IAF and DART due to its 
lack of a discernable group. Through their organizing efforts, U.S. PIRG organizers seek 
to represent the priorities and policy preferences associated with the public interest 
discourse. A comprehensive discursive approach would bridge the divide between the 
public interest and private interests, unfair influence and other relevant discourses. Where 
the state PIRGs succeed in organizing within a discursive framework, they fail to achieve 
this paper’s stated ideal of a comprehensive approach to grassroots organizing. 
A second example, outside the usual community organizing mold, is the 
environmental movement. As opposed to any of the national community organizing 
groups mentioned in the sections above, environmentalism has no set hierarchy or 
institutional affiliations. It stands nevertheless as a movement growing in strength thanks 
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not to its connection to any particular population but instead through its representation of 
a broader discourse. The Sierra Club, for example, operates from a discourse of 
environmental protection. Removed from any human element, this organization 
represents the discourse in political matters. Other examples of such group-less forms of 
grassroots activism are found in antiabortion, anti-death penalty, and pacifist movements.  
While this form of discursive representation does introduce discourse to 
grassroots activism, it remains limited by its one-dimensional nature. That is, it involves 
the representation of only a single discourse rather than the comprehensive representation 
of all involved discourses. The Sierra Club does not claim to speak on behalf of any 
particular group of people but nevertheless promotes one discourse’s own particular 
interests—conservation, renewable fuel sources, etc. Comprehensive discursive 
representation, in contrast, would seek to include the discourses associated with industry, 
mining and other perspectives with a stake in the issue of environmental degradation.  
Both U.S. PIRG and the environmental movement operate within a limited 
discursive framework. While this model does bring grassroots organizing closer to this 
paper’s ideal than other models have, it does not make the final necessary leap to become 
truly revolutionary. Limited discursive representation moves the conversation beyond the 
limits of individual and group representation but fails to promote comprehensive 
democracy. 
 
A Discursive Critique of Organizing Philosophies 
 Discursiveness does not only describe a form of representation or organizing 
philosophies but pervades the entirety of the question in particularly potent ways. 
Belanger 48 
Discourse representation brings to light an important caveat in the discussion. Despite the 
delineation presented above, individual and group representation do not exist separate 
from discursive representation; instead, individualism and a group-oriented organizing 
philosophy serve as discourses in and of themselves. While both may pose as impartial 
conduits through which society might realize its potential for justice—or whatever end a 
community organizer may hold—, they actually hold underlying assumptions that may 
not necessarily be negative but do obscure the claim of impartiality. 
Discursive representation acts then to provide a means by which to evaluate all 
forms of representation and appreciate multiple philosophies of community organizing. 
Rather than singularly correct interpretations of political reality, discourses remain in 
constant flux—as democratic theory would undoubtedly have it. As such, comprehensive 
discursive representation makes possible the fulfillment of democratic potential. By 
refusing permanence and forcing movement, representing discourses requires actors—
individual, group, discourse or otherwise—to consider policy options from a particularly 
valuable dynamic perspective.  
 
Varied Representation in the Virginia Organizing Project 
 The three representational theories exemplified above are not mutually exclusive 
in the realm of grassroots organizing. Remarkably, they can coexist in ways that offer 
significant benefits to organizers who remain open to each of them. In the case of the 
Virginia Organizing Project, a 501(c)(3) based in Charlottesville, Va., grassroots 
organizing involves more than an adherence to any one discourse. In light of the 
discursive critique offered above, the Virginia Organizing Project acts under an 
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organizationally discursive framework. While operating from an unmistakably orthodox 
social justice discourse that falls short of comprehensive discursive organizing, as 
evidenced in the group’s mission statement, VOP does not limit itself to any specific 
organizing discourse and pushes itself to remain institutionally in a state of democratic 
uncertainty. 
The Virginia Organizing Project (VOP) is a statewide grassroots social 
justice organization dedicated to challenging injustice by empowering 
people in local communities to address issues that affect the quality of 
their lives. VOP especially encourages the participation of those who have 
traditionally had little or no voice in our society. By building relationships 
with individuals and groups throughout the state, VOP strives to get them 
to work together, democratically and non-violently, for change (Virginia-
organizing.org).  
 
The organization, in order to achieve these stated goals, refuses the constraints of any 
single philosophy or discourse and opts instead to address them through situational, 
pragmatic lenses. VOP organizers presently engage multiple actors in order to achieve 
common-ground solutions on issues that disciples of less flexible organizing philosophies 
may find themselves unable to address. 
The Virginia Organizing Project shares many common qualities with the other 
organizations explored previously in this chapter. From ACORN, the prototypical 
individualistic grassroots organization, VOP has adopted door-to-door canvassing as a 
significant part of its neighborhood outreach. In its second year, the 2009 VOP Civic 
Engagement Program sent 40 paid interns to cities across the Commonwealth for 10 
fulltime weeks of door-to-door canvassing. Interns asked residents a series of questions, 
passed out literature and explained how to get in touch with representatives in D.C. and 
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Richmond. Interns would also invite residents to register to vote, if they had not already 
done so. 
 In the example of the 10-week canvass, the Virginia Organizing Project adopts a 
philosophy of individual representation in order to achieve the greatest impact on the 
population and among the legislators alike. When organizing a statewide canvass like the 
Civic Engagement Program, the chosen discourse—that which VOP opts to present 
organizationally and its organizers and community leaders opt to present individually—
must center around the capability of the individual to demand justice through avenues 
institutionally open to that individual. The discourse of individual representation which 
other organizing philosophies fail to recognize gives VOP valuable insight into electoral 
politics. When used simultaneously in concert with other organizing discourses, the 
individualistic perspective proves effective and addresses important questions in the 
struggle for social justice. 
In the vein of a group representation discourse, this particular organization speaks 
openly about underrepresentation and misrepresentation of certain demographic groups—
the poor, racial minorities, women and LGBTQ individuals, included—in political 
processes. In this instance, the group discourse partners clearly with a social justice 
discourse. Most notable is VOP’s work to end racial inequalities and address ever-present 
questions of racial tension. Beyond its internal policy of affirmative action, the Virginia 
Organizing Project has developed a program designed to empower communities to 
become capable advocates for equality and understanding across racial lines—i.e. across 
group divisions. Dismantling Racism workshops, common in progressive circles in the 
United States, focus attention on recognition of privilege, confrontation of inequality and 
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action to embrace diversity throughout society. In the same way that the individualistic 
perspective serves it purpose in a canvass setting, group representation lends itself more 
easily to questions of social justice. 
Finally, pulling strongly from the limited discursive model of organizing, VOP 
not only subconsciously makes use of varying discourses but embraces discursive 
representation outright as a means of evaluating communities’ needs and forming a 
public debate. Most clearly embodied in the interorganizational connections the Virginia 
Organizing Project establishes, a social justice discourse pervades throughout the 
nonprofit’s structure. Along with numerous other 501(c)(3) organizations, VOP acts as a 
member of the Virginia c3 Table, a coalition of nonprofits designed to frame politics in 
terms of issues important to people and communities. By bringing together a diverse 
association of organizations, the Table draws upon shared appreciations of the social 
justice discourse. Although not “pure discursive”—group-less—in nature, this focus on 
shared organizations interests beyond a overt human element points to an impure limited 
discursive element in the VOP organizing philosophy. 
 
Conclusion 
 While particular organizing philosophies do line up well with the representation 
discourses described in the previous chapter, none proves capable of achieving their ends 
in their entirety. Where individual, group and limited discursive representation fail, 
comprehensive discursive representation offers a fuller embodiment of both organizing 
philosophies and representation theories. By employing and appreciating these theories of 
organizing as discourses in and of themselves, comprehensive discursive representation 
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enables communities to strive for fuller democracy. Despite the success of organizations 
like the Virginia Organizing Project in creating systems through which attributes and 
practices of different schools of organizing can coexist in positive ways, they still do not 





































This thesis began with the observation that community organizers, insofar as they 
are speaking on behalf of powerless interests, are always acting as representatives. 
Further, we have seen that current grassroots organizers fall under three broad categories: 
individual, group, and limited discourse representation. 
 This chapter proposes that organizers adopt a comprehensive discursive approach 
to grassroots engagement. Discursive representation, as presented by Dryzek, takes place 
in a Chamber of Discourses at the international level. Problematically, this approach is 
exceedingly abstract and impractical. Moreover, it is potentially undemocratic, as it 
removes the popular element from the representative process. This chapter will show that 
it will be far more practical to initiate comprehensive discursive representation at the 
local grassroots level, where forums can be created explicitly for discursive deliberation. 
In this setting, organizers can answer the challenges of discursive representation as 
presented in the present literature. 
 
The Status Quo 
 Before normatively evaluating the wider purpose of community organizing in 
terms of potential or possibility, it would serve this chapter to delve deeper into the way 
in which organizers carry out their missions in the present. Every school of organizing, 
regardless of its take on representation, focuses almost exclusively on increasing or 
bettering the representation of the individuals, groups or discourses with which it works 
rather than striving toward the creation of a generally more representative—or 
democratic—society. ACORN seeks to introduce more marginalized individual voices to 
the political process; DART and IAF focus on the specific groups it deems worthy of 
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special attention; and U.S. PIRG promotes the discourse of the “public interest.” 
Similarly, the Virginia Organizing Project, through its myriad of organizing practices and 
foci, addresses the needs of the poor and oppressed without moving to speak more 
broadly to needs of comprehensive discursive representation. 
 
Organizing for New Representation 
For the other schools of organizing, the dilemma presents itself in more real 
terms. As discursive representation has proven to resolve many of the challenges to more 
orthodox forms of representation, the real question becomes how ought community 
organizers to translate discursive representation from an endeavor of targeted, or limited, 
representation into one of a comprehensive nature. The answer is two-fold: organizers 
should first adopt the principles of open-table organizing and then seek to promote 
broader participation. In following these two practices, which have their roots in the 
theoretical realm explored previously, organizers commit themselves to sustainable 
approaches to community engagement and social change. 
 
Open-Table Organizing 
The widening of the scope of discursive representation lies not in the 
confrontational tactics of past generations of community organizers but instead in a form 
of organizing that seeks to create an open table at which all parties—in this case, 
discourses—are welcome. Even in discourse-based community organizing, organizers 
can often hold “us v. them” mentalities in which issue campaigns are shaped as a struggle 
between one discourse and another. The open-table approach to organizing, on the other 
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hand, refuses the oversimplification of issues and requires fair and just representation of 
all concerned discourses. Possible only in comprehensive approaches to community 
organizing and political representation, the open table provides the means through which 
all discourses receive just representation.  
This concept of tabling has an extensive background in grassroots organizing. 
DART holds pubic forums, and IAF organizers regularly hold public accountability 
meetings. While holding public discussions of important issues is not new, community 
organizers have always done so in a limited manner. Limited tabling cannot promote the 
comprehensive representation of discourses. This new conceptualization of open-table 
organizing must then seek not only an expression of one or a few discourses but instead 
foster the representation of all relevant discourses. 
Tabling also plays a role in Coles’ work on the Industrial Areas Foundation. In his 
discussion of an IAF practice of changing locations for local chapter and public official 
accountability meetings, the organization expands the participatory space of local 
democracy beyond its normal confines of city hall. This practice, the author claims, 
promotes democracy in ways an exclusive centralized practice cannot. “Democracy will 
not be or become solely or primarily at a central table of fixed being and location, but 
only from tables that let themselves be moved and move us to very different spaces and 
modes of relation” (Coles, 2004, p. 694). It is from this concept of inclusiveness through 
physical displacement that the present theory of open-table organizing develops. 
Without a necessarily physical component, open-table practices recognize the 
need to bring different discourses into dialogue with one another in order to achieve 
democratic goals. Not only do the discourses that comprise human identities vary, but so 
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do the ways these discourses interact with one another. As Mansbridge sees it, society 
should stop minimizing and ignoring these complexities and instead foster institutions 
that explore and celebrate the intricate nature of human identity. 
Sometimes our identities articulate relatively harmoniously with one 
another; sometimes they conflict and we need consciously to insist on 
their multiplicity or craft social situations that reinforce their multiplicity; 
sometimes we can compartmentalize and emphasize our different, perhaps 
conflicting, identities in difference places (Mansbridge, 2001, p. 6). 
 
As members of society hold different combinations of discourses, it becomes essential to 
seek a full representation of these discourses in a pragmatic way. Dryzek and Niemeyer’s 
international Chamber of Discourses fails to provide such a framework. 
 By bringing people of different backgrounds together and emphasizing the 
discursive nature of their disagreements, community organizers can fundamentally 
change their field for the better. By avoiding oppositional and confrontational tactics, 
community organizing that includes an open-table element promotes democratic values 
more broadly. Open-table organizing, as opposed to the internationally-focused Chamber, 
provides a markedly local approach to conflict and cooperation. In doing so, it responds 
to the charge of impracticality levied against Dryzek and Niemeyer in the first chapter. 
Comprehensive discursive representation is no longer a lofty abstract principle 
operationalized at the international level. Through local open-table organizing, it gains 
the necessary practical compliment to its important theoretical claims. 
 
Participation 
The second key to implementing comprehensive discursive representation finds 
itself in a careful examination of the concept of participation. To this point, the discussion 
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of organizing approaches has revolved predominately around a study of representation, 
but it is also important to think both theoretically and pragmatically about participation. 
Through participation, comprehensive discursive representation is democratized, and 
discursive organizing is thus implemented. 
 
As a Contemporary Danger 
Participation, despite its immediate positive connotations poses challenges in the 
modern political context. Carole Pateman, one of the most influential modern scholars of 
participatory democratic theory, calls attention in particular to the argument of 
cooptation. Citing Sydney Verba, Pateman states that “pseudo participation” comes to 
pass when people are invited to discuss decisions after the fact; the danger lies in the false 
sense of participation bred through such a process (Pateman, 1970, p. 69). Systems that 
create in their constituent citizenries feelings of efficacy without actually permitting—
much less fostering or encouraging—participatory activities themselves stand in the way 
of democratic ideals and, ultimately, pose threats to authentic participation wherever it 
exists. If, for example, within the current individualistic understanding of participation, 
the president of the United States was actually selected by a council of powerful 
corporate CEOs, the votes of millions of individual citizens would instill a sense of 
participation without giving them an actual voice in the decision-making process. 
Similarly, in an industrial setting, management may delegate smaller decisions to 
workers; however, when it comes to more fundamental questions of output, wages or 
working conditions, it is far less likely that management will give real power to its 
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employees. Pseudo participation prevents the development of meaningful civic skills and 
instead breeds pseudo satisfaction and complacency with a nonparticipatory system. 
Pseudo participation proves especially worrisome at the grassroots level. In any 
part of political society, such a misconstrued understanding of participation can 
undermine the very fabric of political life. Its potential consequences in the realm of 
community organizing stand out in sharp distinction to the practice’s purported aims of 
inclusion, empowerment and mass mobilization. Herein lies the great risk of invoking 
participation in the formulation of a new mold of comprehensive discursive community 
organizing; with claims of grassroots transformation and reimagined participation come 
also the ever-looming possibility of abuse, misinformation and a defeated, disheartened 
public. 
The threats inherent to a participatory ethos do not limit themselves to the 
possibility of a manipulated or manufactured sense of involvement. Another major 
concern arises in the form of instability in the process of participation. “In recent years, 
the inability to [strike the proper balance among various forms of political participation] 
has led to growing incivility and occasional threats to overall system stability” 
(Rimmerman, 1997, p. 72). For example, the coexistence of participation through vote-
casting and more unorthodox or socially unacceptable forms of participation—protest, 
boycott, etc.—promotes instability. The citizen who understands her participatory role in 
political society as one of lever-pulling every other year will find it difficult to avoid 
conflict with another citizen who believes that true, effective participation must 
necessarily be strident and confrontational. 
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Not all theorists of participation agree that instability is an inevitable product of a 
more active citizenry. According to Pateman, the concern over participation-induced 
instability is overblown. As she understands it, participation does not exist as a single 
destabilizing force in isolation from the rest of society but as a pervasive characteristic of 
a new kind of political culture. Citizens learn to participate by participating; therefore, 
stability is not threatened by participation. As people begin to participate, they have 
already been “educated” for it and are therefore not caught off-guard by any “new” 
phenomenon of participation (Pateman, 1970, p. 105). The educative function of 
participation can thus minimize destabilization. Modern worries about the revitalization 
of democratic participation, while well-founded and worthy of consideration, do not 
obscure the fact: participation in an engaged society—and in a comprehensive discursive 
style of organizing—is not optional but absolutely necessary. 
 
As a Transformative Element of Democracy 
Given such a daunting task and the aforementioned risks inherent in the 
organizing setting, one must question the reasons for invoking such potentially 
destructive issue as participation in the discussion at hand. Pateman, again, sheds light on 
this query; according to her understanding of participatory democracy, grassroots-level 
participation is a necessary component of effective political systems. Participation serves 
an important purpose in the development of civic skills that ultimately yield stronger 
democracies; at the lower levels of government, it creates a stronger sense of political 
efficacy (Pateman, 1970, p. 73). For Pateman, the national political scene simply does not 
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offer the same opportunities to the individual citizen to feel that her voice matters as 
county, city and even neighborhood political bodies do. 
For this transition to effective participation at the grassroots level to take place, 
Pateman claims that the modern understanding of politics must expand to include 
previously apolitical components of the social landscape. “The notion of a participatory 
society requires that the scope of the term ‘political’ is extended to cover spheres outside 
the national government” (Pateman, 1970, p. 106). Accordingly, where the even-year 
voting booth and communications with Congressional representatives may have at one 
time been the sole spaces for political participation, contemporary needs require that 
observers recognize the local expressions of political life as found in public squares, 
community posting boards and the editorial sections of the local newspapers.  
Beyond this, even, lies the participatory potential of urban alleys, front porches 
and corner markets as spaces where citizens can engage with the political world around 
them. More significantly, the failure to recognize these unorthodox participatory practices 
exhibits an unmistakable middle-class bias. The traditional forms of participation ground 
themselves in a bourgeois discourse that assumes education, literacy and access to 
adequate information. Even a participatory democrat like Pateman, by focusing 
predominately on modes of participation accessible to and predominate among the 
middle-class, rejects the value of marginalized forms of participation. What distinguishes 
a conversation on someone’s front porch on the poor side of town from the written 
opinion published in a newspaper with a largely white middle-class readership? Steeped 
in European philosophical tradition, this understanding of participation fails to convey the 
full picture of engagement in the political process. As one author claims, “classical 
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liberalism” excludes notions of community and participation (Rimmerman, 1997, p. 16). 
Participation as a common community activity, then, receives only minimal attention 
when considered through the dominant Enlightenment-era discourse. Modes of political 
dialogue unorthodox in form, despite their historical exclusion, nevertheless provide 
other avenues by which participation can transfer from the national to the local level. 
 Here, attention must turn to the raw mechanics involved in the creation and 
maintenance of a participatory ethos. As Rimmerman sees it, the realization of 
participation requires not only positive growth but also a deconstruction of certain social 
influences. “From the vantage point of participatory democrats, the political socialization 
process impedes meaningful and effective participation because citizens are socialized to 
embrace the values of privatism and radical individualism that are rooted in liberal 
democracy” (Rimmerman, 1997, p. 17). The paradox emerges that, in order for an 
essential democratic practice to flourish, society must be willing to unlearn the very 
foundation of the earliest Western democracies. Socialization, as Rimmerman 
understands it, trains Americans to conceive of democracy as the institutionalized 
government and its principles as discussed in the Constitution (Rimmerman, 1997, p. 18), 
as opposed to a more open-ended concept perpetually open to challenge and constantly 
benefiting from debate. Rather than embrace this particularly conservative American 
form of representative democracy, it would serve the population better to train its 
attention instead on some form of engaged participatory democracy. The discourse of 
liberal individualism discourages participation to this radical extent and, as such, must be 
viewed critically by democracy-promoters in modern American society. 
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 In the setting of grassroots organizing, participation plays an integral role in the 
creation of community. In much of the contemporary grassroots political landscape, a 
well-defined “community” simply does not exist. Post-industrial metropolitan centers 
pulled people from their roots and now, in the wake of factory closings and population 
shifts, central cities seem to be little more than grouping of unrelated people with 
divergent interests. This image of urban America is not, however, the end of the story. 
“In a true participatory setting, citizens do not merely act as autonomous individuals 
pursuing their own interests, but instead, through a process of decision, debate, and 
compromise, they ultimately link their concerns with the needs of the community” 
(Rimmerman, 1997, p. 19). For an organizer confronted with the challenge of a atomized 
neighborhood or city, participation serves as a tool through which the private and 
public—two arenas that stand in stark contrast one from the other—might come to 
mutual recognition. Participation, it thus seems, is not only a characteristic of democratic 
society but also a provocateur of social change following democratic principles. 
Rimmerman, following his evaluation of participation, explains what he 
understands to be the two contrasting conceptualizations of the role of the citizenry. In 
the first of these, which some would argue more closely resembles the citizenship of this 
chapter in American history, citizens center around an 
electoral-representative democracy, which emphasizes the importance of 
elections and the lobbying of interest groups at the national, state, and 
local levels. Bargaining and compromise typify the decision-making 
process. Citizen participation is assumed to be the same as voter 
participation. It is this conception of citizenship that grows out of the 
democratic theory of elitism (Rimmerman, 1997, p. 75) 
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The alternative form of citizenship, preferred by Rimmerman and like-minded theorists 
of engaged democracy, emphasizes the central role of public action. “A second 
conception, steeped in participatory democratic principles, emphasizes grass-roots 
organizing and mobilization rooted in community building, cooperation, alliance 
formation, and self-help” (Rimmerman, 1997, p. 75).  
The practical side of this concept shows itself most clearly in Rimmerman’s 
discussion of the Kettering Foundation’s Politics for the Twenty-First Centruy: What 
Should be Done on Campus? The Foundation proposes four approaches to citizen 
education: “learning by doing—the public service component”, “learning by talking—
acquiring deliberative skills”, “learning by practicing—democratizing the campus”, 
“learning by learning—a classical academic model” (Rimmerman, 1997, p. 100-101). 
This chapter, while an exercise in the final approach of learning by learning, seeks to 
expose the benefits to organizing gained through an emphasis on these four practices. 
Particularly through the comprehensive discursive approach, grassroots organizers can 
work to realize the democracy-promoting benefits of participation. 
 
As a Fundamental Component of Discursive Organizing 
Upon first assessment, discourse representation may seem to undermine 
participation in very fundamental ways. According to Dryzek’s operationalization, the 
representation of discourses requires minimal participation. The only active participants 
written into the theory are the representatives of different discourses; furthermore, these 
discourses do not reflect proportionality in society nor is their inclusion in the Chamber 
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of Discourses dependent upon their having even a single adherent. His theory, as is, 
further increases the gap between people and representative decision-making. 
Comprehensive discursive organizing, while drawing strongly on Dryzek’s 
theoretical groundwork, fuses previously opposing forces of participatory democracy and 
discursive representation. The importance of knowing fully the characteristics and 
intricacies of varying discourses necessitates participation. For this reason, discursive 
representation at the grassroots level relies heavily on engaged participation—on the 
ability of affected community members to constitute and convey discourses in their 
fullness. As Dryzek conceives of it, a discourse receives fair representation when a single 
individual representative proves capable of embodying that discourse, a problematic 
assertion addressed in earlier chapters. This “One Man, One Discourse” mantra may well 
serve the theoretical purposes of the Chamber of Discourses at an abstract international 
level, but its practical application is problematic at best. Discursive organizing must then 
turn to a new instrument of representation through which different discourses gain 
recognition and communicate one with the other.  
Discourses, by their definition, shape people’s understandings of the world in 
which they live. In order to grasp the full meaning and implications of a discourse, an 
outside observer—one who does not share that discourse—must see it from a multitude 
of vantage points. In consensus-oriented discursive organizing, great value lies in the 
interaction of different, even conflicting discourses. Rather than rely on individual 
representatives, which harkens back to the same insurmountable obstacles evident in 
individual representation itself, discursive organizing uses widespread participation to 
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inform these open-table conversations and make for a more vibrant, truly representative 
society. 
 Rimmerman, in making his case for participatory citizenship, cites a study that 
explains the attractiveness of participation through the chance of change. 
 The study Main Street America (Hardwood Group, 1991) found that the 
key to citizen participation by those who actually participated was the 
possibility of change, not the certainty of success. If this study is at all 
accurate, then Americans can overcome participation obstacles if they 
perceive that their participation may have a meaningful effect… 
(Rimmerman, 1997, p. 45). 
 
Within the framework of comprehensive discursive organizing, it is this possibility of 
change that drives citizens to get involved. Where other organizing philosophies have 
failed and political institutions fallen short, discursive organizing offers a new hope—a 
hope that can be achieved only through active participation. It is for this reason that 
participation serves an integral role in the comprehensive discursive model of grassroots 
organizing. A non-participatory model would contradict its own purposes. In this sense, 
participation is not only a necessary component of comprehensive discourse-based 
organizing but also a mark of its success.  
 
Democratizing Discursive Organizing 
 With this understanding of discursive organizing as a two-fold process of open 
tabling and participation in place, one must also recognize the democratization of 
comprehensive discursive representation. Dryzek and Niemeyer conceive of discursive 
representation in a fundamentally antidemocratic way. An expert-driven exclusionary 
Chamber of Discourses removes the human element from the representative equation 
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(Näsström, 2009). This thesis seeks to reformulate discursive representation in more 
democratic terms. This task rests upon discursive organizing’s ability to promote 
democracy more broadly. In combination with the local comprehensive discursive 
organizing presented in this chapter, it does so by emphasizing the importance of 
subjectively held discourses and relying upon the plurality of discourses held within the 
individual self. 
 This thesis, in a democracy-bolstering move, places significance on discourses as 
they are subjectively held. Dryzek and Niemeyer require all discourses to be represented 
in the Chamber. Even if not a single individual holds a particular discourse as a 
constitutive element of his or her identity, it must receive equal representation in the 
assembly. The human element is extracted from the representative process. In the local 
setting, this requirement is unnecessary, impractical and misguided. Within a limited 
demos, “comprehensive” refers not to all imaginable discourses but instead only to such 
discourses as they are subjectively held by those within that area. Comprehensive 
discursive representation, as made practical through grassroots organizing, has set 
boundaries within which to operate; accordingly, organizers more completely represent 
the community by only representing the discourses found within that community. 
 The outward comprehensive representation of discourses also mirrors the inward 
deliberation typical of democratic theory. As this paper has argued uncontentiously from 
the opening chapter, individuals are composed of a multitude of discourses. When an 
individual casts a vote, the most fundamental of orthodox democratic practices, it is not a 
question of forthright presentation but rather a show of representation. That individual is 
representing the results of an internal deliberation that the individual conducted on his or 
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her own. Through a comprehensive public representation of discourses, discursive 
organizing allows for this deliberation to move from the private to the public sphere. The 
inclusion of other discourses makes for a more comprehensive representative process, 
and better policy options are thus pursued. As argued above, a participatory form of 
comprehensive discursive representation ensures this democratic element.  
 Through open-table organizing and an emphasis on participation, discursive 
organizing fulfills the demands of democracy. Related to this concept of grassroots 
organizing is that of deliberative democracy, which similarly promotes deliberative 
groups both small and large through which individual citizens form their political 
opinions. The keystone of this theory rests in deliberation.  
When talking to one another in their small and large groups, Americans 
will be not encountering one another as consumers or coreligionists or 
even friends—but as citizens searching for common group, engaged in the 
great task of reconstructing a thin but precious civic bond that ties us all 
together in a common enterprise (Ackerman & Fishkin, 2003, p. 22). 
 
Deliberative democracy literature proposes a similar positive process through which to 
achieve a more comprehensive democratic ideal. However, the process does ultimately 
rely upon an individual-based discourse of vote-casting, which engenders inconsistencies 
and difficulties for the promoters of deliberation (Pettit, 2003, p. 148-149). Regardless of 
this criticism, deliberative democracy nevertheless points to a theoretical groundwork 
upon which practical discursive organizing can establish itself. 
 
Conclusion 
 An ACORN organizer knocks on a fragile duplex door, and paint chips rain down 
on the recent college graduate’s worn sneakers. An elderly Latina woman answers the 
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door. In a combination of broken Spanish and English, the two enter into a conversation 
about turning the neighborhood around for the better. After a few minutes, the woman is 
handed a voter registration form and told where to find information on the organization’s 
issue priorities. The organizer thanks her for her time and moves on to the next door. As 
this woman thinks about how she will vote in that fall’s election, she works through her 
different interests in her head. A fellow Latina is running for a state house seat held by 
someone who attends her church. She deliberates and reaches a conclusion.  
The following Sunday evening at mass, the priest introduces an organizer with the 
Industrial Areas Foundation to speak about the concerns of that faith congregation. The 
same old woman, already having mailed off her registration form and decided how to 
vote, hears this man speak about the social gospel and about what Jesus did when 
confronted poverty and need. She joins a discussion after church to draft a group letter to 
the city council. Following the conversation, the final draft of the letter expresses what 
the church body as a group feels about a particular zoning ordinance perceived to be 
biased against poor families. 
This woman attends IAF meetings regularly and continues to vote in line with 
ACORN’s agenda, but little changes. Conditions continue to deteriorate. Politicians enter 
and leave office. Both ACORN and IAF claim victories here and there, but this woman 
sees little fundamental change. It is in response to cases like these that this thesis was 
written. Discursive organizing, rooted in comprehensive discursive representation, 
addresses not only the fleeting policy questions of day-to-day political life but works to 
reshape the very way public citizens influence their government. It moves the 
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deliberative process from the individual- or group-level to the broader public by adopting 
comprehensive discursive representation. 
 Discursive organizing, a new form of grassroots engagement, founds itself on the 
combination of comprehensive discourse representation theory with practices of open-
table organizing and participation. While this project’s opening chapter explores the 
benefits inherent in representing discourses, it is only through the above examination of 
the practices themselves that this approach to organizing demonstrates its democratic 
potential. Departing from historical norms of organizing as an oppositional endeavor and 
infusing participation and consensus-building into an otherwise scientific discursive 
process, this chapter’s claims lay the groundwork for practical application and further 
study. Community organizers have a great deal of potential on their sides; through its 
proper application, the communities with which they engage can realize the democratic 
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